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Abstract 
The purpose here is to intervene within some dominant strands of videogame 
scholarship and propose a more problematic relation to our object. The two 
dominant tendencies taken-up here represent what has come to be self-styled as a 
media studies 2.0 model, over and against a supposedly previously dominant (and 
retroactivated as outmoded) 1.0.1 Proposed in opposition to these somewhat 
sweeping positions will be a deconstructive model which, while disagreeing with 
these theoretical ‘algorithms’, would not believe itself to be leading a charge 
toward any notionally more thoroughgoingly circumnavigating 3.0 account. 
Specifically, while the 2.0 account proposes a “new” active first-person 
Performative framework versus an “old” third-person indicative Constative, we 
would recommend a reworked iterative-Performative as propounded in the works 
of Derrida and Butler. 
 
Keywords: différance, undecidable, narrative, first-person, third-person, 
performative, constative, interpellation, suture, reflexivity. 
 
***** 
 
1.  Introduction 
To briefly recount the saga: the outmoded 1.0 account2 tended to grant 
supremacy to the machine, supply, or server side of the communicative equation 
leaving for the audience only an intractable, non interactable blank space to be 
crowded-out by an insuperable-power: the subject(-objective) is overwhelmed by 
the text’s all too powerful mode-of-address. Within this previously dominant 
model of domination then each ‘text’ would form (from its secured vantage 
point) a linear-perspectival control-engine that would either hypodermically 
inject (older-outmoded theory) or interpellate (more modern-outmoded theory) 
their object-individual as their subject. This denial of any space either to play or 
to poke polysemical holes into the socialising fabric of the oncoming text 
constituted the figure then of an indivisible program(me) acting as some locally 
firewalled representative of a much larger media-industrial eco-system. While 
some theorists felt that this did a disservice to the multifarious positionality of the 
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receiving audiences (that there was always a residual meaning allowance or a 
polysemic-playspace3 within the static and weaved net of a particular text’s 
‘material’ signifiers), there was still nonetheless a strong server-sided control of 
what composed the message (to borrow de Certeau’s language: there is still an 
organised supermarket from which we must shop, even if we get to play a little 
within its space4).  
Let us timeshift. The tectonic plates of the media were noticeably 
shifting around the early 1990’s. A crossing of the divisive stage-boundary began 
(hypercards for example5) with the birth of ‘the wreader’, a sort of Barthesian 
writerly but this time adding signifier, paradigm and pathway choices (what 
Aarseth would later call ‘variable expression’6) to the aforementioned semantic 
latitude of those signifieds. The recent birth of these interactors began to make 
such ageing theories, even of semantic/subcultural play7, seem untenable. The 
tectonics of the object itself began to drift from under these theorists’ weary feet. 
This move then from texts with relatively determining meta-narrators8 to 
texts that stepped outside of such trajectorial-boundaries demanded a somewhat 
different outlook if a media theorist’s reflections were to keep pace with media 
practsumption (consumption-practice) and to offer something fit for a changing 
media infrastructure. As example of this reality-pull, in the UK a lively email 
debate amongst scholars9 ensued within which a number of new-broom media 
educators pointed out the changing shape of their student’s more ludic10 media 
experiences (algorithmically: how can we carry on teaching film and media 
theory 1.0 when students have moved on to the internet, mobile phones and 
games and whose media experiences are thus far from continuous and playless?). 
In place of the ideologically determined subject exemplified by Althusser et al, 
these scholars suggested Media Studies 2.0 where a reflexive subject, prepared for 
variously by Caillois, Butler and Giddens, might provide a more fitting analytic. 
Before however looking at 2.0’s more proper and up-to-date approach let us look 
in a little more detail at this 1.0 model’s attempted expansion into new media 
territory. 
 
2.  Theory 1.0: Third-Personed Spectatorial-Constatives 
 As an exemplar for the problematic extension of so-called media theory 
1.0 into the alien realm of games let us present a brief case study. Rehak11 re-
issues (into games) interpellation or the ‘hey you!’ function of the text, from its 
original setting within film theory12 and puts it to work in its new surroundings by 
finding equivalents or replacements within the videogame. This occurs in much 
the same way as when for film theory MacCabe13 famously replaced literature’s 
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omniscient written third-person commentary (operating everywhere that is 
outside character quotations) with the film camera and edit’s positioning of what 
he termed dominant specularity.  Rehak’s replacement (or supplementation) of 
the film camera function in the game actually makes the immersion or ‘loss’ to 
the space more powerful than ever: 
 
[F]irst, the use of subjective POV to create a newly 
participatory role for the spectator; and second, the concept of 
interpellation and its function, within discourse, in constructing 
apparently unified subject positions [...] the subject position 
created through shot-reverse-shot is replaced in the FPS [first-
person shooter] by a camera simulated through software 
rendering of these three-dimensional spaces [...] literalises the 
conceit of an embedded diegetic participant [my emphasis] that 
cinema, because of its material technologies, can only imply.14 
 
 While in many ways an impressively argued paper, the above excerpt 
betokens an overly optimistic reorienting of apparatus theory imported 
inappropriately into the game’s quite undecidable ‘spacetime’. For here to speak 
of a “diegetic participant” is to take the concept of ‘diegesis’ (storyworld) and to 
concomitantly equate the player as an insider-character (or here paradoxically 
flipped outsider-captured) embedded within a ‘space’ which is in fact neither 
quite text nor non-text (non-text would be something anarchically without 
overarching arché-textual structure like the internet): being neither decidedly 
diegetic nor extra-diegetic15. This undecidable difficulty will later form an 
important component within our own investigation of the gamic spacetime. 
 Further, according to Rehak the suturing function of the cinematic shot-
reverse-shot (presumed to subject the spectator within the difference of framing 
positions16) finds a direct equivalence in the game’s free-roaming simulated 
camera that would here make the player forget their difference and distance from 
the presumed diegesis. A sort of umbilical-alliance here comports the game-
control as of a prosthetic extension (for that control would extend the screen 
outward) and in so prosthetising-the-player would swallow the player into the 
‘diegetic’ matrix and make of them a mere third-person-subject of the space17.  
 As third-person subject of the space the gamer would seem to 
misrecognise their pre-textual identity for that of a character already embedded 
within the game’s “diegesis”. To unpack this problematic idea of a diegetic 
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already-embeddedness it will be worth looking in a little more detail at this 
borrowed model of the cinematic subjection and misrecognition before returning 
to Rehak’s own gamic application. According to Doane18 identification within the 
cinematic apparatus works on three distinct levels. After Metz19 she points out 
that these three modes of identification are with the character, of objects (and 
issues) and finally with the projection/screen as an act of ‘the gaze’ or looking in 
itself. This latter identification acts as a mode of primary identification which 
subsumes and forms the condition of the possibility of the other two (which are 
contentual and thus downstream or secondary in form).  
 By the mere act of looking the cinematic spectator forgets their own 
distinction and is thus enveloped by and made subject of the apparatus. Doane 
points out that ‘[T]he pleasure of misrecognition ultimately lies in the 
confirmation of the subject’s mastery over the signifier’20. This “mastery” is 
however the very misrecognition that is their actual non-mastery (for this gaze or 
look does not master, bring-forth or change the signifier). This act of looking 
within an apparatus which envelopes causes the spectator to misrecognise their 
look for a look which has the power to bring-forth. On this model, this 
misrecognised power to bring-forth, to master or ‘write’ the space in-front in fact 
writes or inscribes the passive spectator themselves:  the mistaken feeling of 
performing (of being the hero) within the film constitutes the spectator’s very 
passivity or actual non-mastery. For the primary-projection of the screen itself 
and the secondary-look of the protagonist within that screen hollows-out both the 
spectator’s subjection as well as the film’s own fixed narratological futurity. This 
voyeuristic misrecognition of having potency over the cinematic signifier would 
seem then to write, inscribe or suture them securely into the screen-space; writing 
them ‘in’ as though they were the themselves third-person constative character 
already hardwired and pre-written within the film’s screenplay or cinematic 
ecriture. Such a self-less cinematic subjection leaves no room for any  play or 
indeterminacy over the signifier. How can this be for the videogame? 
 By expanding this model into the game any screen/play is thus turned 
into a more powerfully functioning and diegetically immersed linearising 
screenedplay. To return again to Rehack. Another strategic re-encounter with 
cinematic suture makes the point of a cinematic sort of subjection all the more 
strongly: 
 
The film spectator’s role as an implied observer of narrative 
events -an “absent one” flickering ghostlike through the 
diegesis, positioned anew from shot to shot- is concretised in 
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the video game imaginary through the figure of the avatar, a 
“present one” standing in for the player, who chooses the path 
of the camera-body with apparent freedom. The disavowal 
necessary to gameplay is like the “Yes, that’s what I see” of 
successful cinematic suture, but goes further: it is “Yes, that’s 
what I do”21 
 
This “Yes” is of course an inauthentic and very small ‘yes’ which would 
remediate the succumbing-slumber of a massed cinematic ‘they-self22’ which then 
‘[b]ecomes an extreme form of subject positioning, a scenario of continuous 
suture’23. Without the ‘breaks’ that film’s shot-reverse-shot lends to the viewer, 
the “continuous suture” of the game actually makes for a more powerfully 
immersive apparatus or mechanism; one, as it were, without breaks24. This all 
begins to sound so much like slavery. For the game program’s the gamer, just as 
the programmer would first have presumably programmed ‘the program’25..   
While on the 1.0 side we have the remediated26 locked conveyer-belt of 
the filmic world so theorised, on the other (new side) we have a theory which 
would supplant such subjections. For these media ‘performances’ really cannot 
be seen as ‘programs’ and call for a much freer interactor to marry-up with the 
much freer post-programming of this modern world. Enter 2.0. 
 
3.  Theory 2.0: First-Person Performatives 
Here we can see coming into view a first-person experience in the sense 
of someone who comes ‘before’ something in all their phenomenological purity. 
Keeping this in mind it is important to explore here two key components in 2.0’s 
armoury: ‘reflexivity’ and ‘performativity’. To take the first. Key Media 2.0 
theorist Gauntlett argues that sociologist Giddens’ notion of reflexive identity 
provides a key lever in coming to a clearer theoretical understanding of the 
contours of the present media landscape: 
 
Giddens is fascinated by the growing amounts of reflexivity in 
all aspects of society, from formal government at one end of the 
scale to intimate sexual relationships at the other [...]. Doing 
things just because people did them in the past is – is the 
opposite of modern reflexivity.27 
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Thus we seem to have moved on from a traditional society with its 
unreflective doing-as-is-done; a machinic society of robotically pre-conscious 
‘they-selfs’ where audiences were locked into the linearity of the media’s 
handiwork. For here at least 2.0 agrees with 1.0, but argues however that now the 
world has moved along from such multitudinal ‘they-selfs’ to more singularly 
present ‘my-self’ narrations and more singular life-times. To outline the contours 
of these flexible identities Gauntlett utilises Judith Butler’s notion of the 
‘Performative’ but must first provide a little more flexibility for it in order to 
purchase a little more freedom for his own performative:  
 
Furthermore we do not need to worry too much about this [that 
the perfomative is not radically free of the materiality of the 
body]: every thinker puts forward tools which we can choose to 
use, or modify, or reject. I feel that the tools in ‘Gender 
Trouble’ are more useful, relevant and exciting than some of 
the more cautious ideas in Butler’s later works28 
 
This above statement of ‘intent’ in itself performs a radical 
misunderstanding of a quotation it so recently (on the same page) utilised. 
Gauntlett finds some of Butler’s later positions too “depressing” and “cautious”’ 
and would prefer to take ideas from an earlier more vital time in her writings. But 
is not Butler pointing out within the quotation that in the previous book she had 
already said what she was so “depressingly” saying in the later one? She does 
this because she says that she is (having to) anchor and restate her position for 
those who skipped too lightly over what she had originally stated: thus in a strong 
sense she is here arguing for this later book contribution to be placed, as an 
interpretative buttress, within the space of those earlier passages to fend off such 
misinterpretations. Like the one Gauntlett is here making. For she says: 
 
One of the interpretations that has been made of Gender 
Trouble is that there is no sex, there is only gender, and gender 
is performative. People then go on to think that if gender is 
performative it must be radically free. And it has seemed to 
many that the materiality of body is vacated or ignored or 
neglected here – disavowed, even […] I think that I overrode 
the category of sex too quickly in Gender Trouble. I try to 
reconsider it in Bodies that Matter, and to emphasise the place 
of constraint in the very production of sex.29 
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Thus a double (portfolio) choice is being made here by Gauntlett as to 
what one takes from an informing theorist but without uniformly sticking to their 
word: one on the surface, the other buried out in the open. Whilst our point here 
may seem just a little too ‘pedantic’ there seems to be operating within Gauntlett 
a radical free-wheeling form of ‘choice’ radically independent of the materials 
being foraged upon. Taken within this rather flexible context there can never be 
any such thing as a (wilful) misreading and one can never then be accused of 
being selective or deceptive in cutting-up and wearing the parchments of one’s 
sources: a very anarchic database or portfolio30.  
These notions of ‘reflexivity’ and the individualised ‘performative’ 
along with related notions of what have been termed ‘portfolio identities’31 aim 
towards a free-floating subjectivity cut free from the shackles of the traditional 
pre-reflexive, ‘tied’ or localised identities. A reflexive performativity such as this 
however appears to be a rather crude notion, tautologically pointing toward the 
figure of somebody standing on the ground of their own two feet. There is here 
within this ‘reflexive-performativity’ a sort of giddy auto-erotic freedom (a much 
simplified Nietzschean self-making) which would see itself as existing a level-
above and beyond the old traditional or grounded identities. Sherry Turkle along 
the similar lines talks of new media as spaces which allow us to explore and 
expand our individual identities32. On this model networking sites (also ‘Second-
Life’ and videogames) would allow us to create ourselves again and show 
ourselves as new faces each time anew to the world (a morphous or protean 
being-outside-the-world).  
An interestingly befuddled argument on the morphous and playful 
performativeness by Filiciak33 would merit further symptomatic investigation for 
the problem of identity which would seem to be both free (in that like Gauntlett 
he celebrates the protean nature of “postmodern” identity opportunities within 
games) yet sees the player as soon to be swallowed up into some cyberspatial 
self-forgetting (which presumably would land us back into a form of slavery?). 
He argues thus:  
 
We are creating our “self” not as a linear process of 
construction and striving towards some original target –each 
identity we create is a temporary formation. Erosion of our 
individual “self” in macro scale is reflected in the fall of 
collected identities, like a nation [...] we cannot talk anymore 
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about a single identity that produces temporary identities 
subordinate to itself. Thus in the era of electronic media we 
should rather talk about hyperidentity, which is related to 
identity as hypertext to a text.34 
 
However four pages earlier we find that such playful opportunities for 
morphing our identities is based yet again on a model where the player finds 
themselves con-fused with the textual universe within which they find themselves 
wrapped up. The power of Cinematic identification again finds itself rehoused: 
 
The process of secondary identification taking place in 
cinema theatres depends paradoxically on distance while in the 
case of games we encounter something more than just intimacy. 
Identification is replaced by introjections-the subject is 
projected inward into an “other”. The subject (player) and the 
“other” (the onscreen avatar) do not stand at the opposite sides 
of the mirror anymore-they become one.35 
 
How to square this rather contradictory argument? Here, as somewhat 
obliquely alluded to above, we find a common ground between 1.0 constative 
subjection theory and 2.0 reflexive performative theory. Both are equally 
symptomatic of an ideology of ‘the arrival’. In both wrapping up a constative  
completion of  a subjection to the apparatus (1.0) or  conversely a completion of 
reflexive-performative absolute self-presence (2.0) both positions end up equally 
saying the same thing: “the space and the user are indivisible”. For as a 
program-space we cannot be divided apart from it and as a me-space we equally 
cannot be divided apart from it (for it gives me everything I would want whatever 
this I turns out to be when floating around itself). To begin to close-up the 2.0 
performative stage of our argument: by being able to choose our avatar and then 
change their position we would seem to float-free upon cyberspatial air, 
destabilising any previously dominant Cartesian or Euclidean coordination. 
 So here on the internet and within cyberspace we are within the presence 
of very concrete and open wormholes and thus the true death of the boundary 
would seem to be imminently or immanently upon us. The private, carved-off 
space of the previously dominant ‘cogito-text’ now gives way to a sort of infinite 
bleeding-out, as all the connections which previously were furtively sought out 
(by merely reading) become open and available as destinations (of reflexive self-
becoming).  Within six hyperlinks then we experience a giddy separation from 
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our original “location”.  The olde texts of 1.0 then give-way to a mere resource 
and thus throw us back upon our own giddy and now free-roaming self-present 
identities. This self-present first-person performative self-movement will need 
much deconstructive unpacking. 
 
 
4. First-Person Multiple: Iterable Performatives  
 
Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did 
not repeat a “coded” or iterable utterance, or in other words, if 
the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a 
ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an 
iterable model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as a 
“citation”?...In such a typology, the character of intention will 
not disappear; it will have its place, but from that place it will 
no longer be able to govern the entire scene or system of the 
utterance. 36 
 
The Performative, here reinterpreted by Derrida (and also quoted by 
Butler37 to underline her own Derridean use of the performative) as quasi-
citation, always-already penetrates into the Constative (which we, and by 
extension 2.0 labelled as 1.0). Austin’s performative38 would be the self-
presenting first-person singular-pronominal active present-participle of the “I-do” 
(furnishing the, for example, the famous speech act of the I-do of the wedding 
rites39). This singular presence however is predicated and reliant upon (iterative) 
the ‘past-perfect’ of the “you-did” that would seem in comparison to this first-
person singularity to be an externally cold and stale recording, citation or writing 
technology40. Thus the citational writing-within-speech (we could recoin it arché-
citation) that is Derrida’s own reworked ‘performative’41 points to a différantial-
undecideability (between –but not beyond- ‘performative’ and ‘constative’ as 
opposites) that can also be seen to be at the heart of the videogame which neither 
a constative 1.0 theory nor the performative 2.0 theory could circumscribe. For in 
the game, as we will see, there is an excess or dissemination that overruns or 
invaginates the boundary of any third or first-person position.  
Beyond these (1.0 vs. 2.0) views then, it is preferable that the game 
should not be conceived of as a program(me) at all. For within this compounded 
neologism both a closed ‘program’ (1.0) and a closed ‘(me)’ (2.0) presumes a 
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violatory concept of an outer hacking or breaching of erected ‘meta’ fences that 
would attempt to fend off such incursions or breechings by some notionally errant 
alterity. For in the old ‘sovereign-spaces’ of the linear media text or program(me) 
there are the countless protections against fore-seen audience dissention, 
dialogically contained within, as constitutive of their very boundary or notionally 
‘cleaved’ singular-existence42). As a concomitant of this non-limit in the game, 
and at this point still in a measure of agreement with 2.0, we must also be wary of 
utilising unproblematised concepts from film or literary-linear studies such as 
‘diegetic space’. For here a distinct or internal ‘diegetic space’ (to be divided off 
from the notionally ‘extra-diegetic space’ of the ‘audient’ encountering that 
“theatrical” en-closure) would create a too neat divide, frame or parergon which 
does no justice to the openly invaginated nature of the space that is the game-
staging43: the outlying districts of the game are not so circumavigable. This lack 
of a diegetic framing or of a carved-off narrative space becomes all the more 
conspicuous when we see that there is no ‘One’ in the sense of a clear narrative 
agency. Here we come upon the importance of the first/third person problem for 
the videoogame. 
 In the game there is a clear (and essential) undecidability between the 
first and the third person subject positions (performative and constative 
respectively) whose vibrating-interlace will deny the ability of the space-of-play 
to wrap up its incorporated ‘protagonist’. Before coming to land squarely on this 
however we must briefly look at a very important transition between the game 
and its linear subject-position forebears, one also that makes it very different to 
the externality of subject positions within the internet experience (could one here 
even think in the region of first or third person?). Within literature, and in its 
transportation to film, the difference of the first and the third-person never hands 
over an active ‘signifier’ arranging role to the person who is doing the reading or 
the spectating (hence now the neat new celebratory baptismal-neologism of the 
morphed reader+writer=wreader). The handing over of the optical first-person 
position in a few select linear-films never hands over the reigns to the viewer 
however. This is a very different to first and third undecidables within the 
game44. One need only look at one of film’s famous (and few) incursions into the 
“first-person” territory to see the difficulties of taking up the optic alignment and 
concomitantly then assuming to make of the spectator the key player.  
Montgomery’s Film-Noir ‘Lady in the Lake’45 was an experiment in film 
which took cinematic suture and the dominant point-of-view and transformed 
these into a constant optical-point-of-view. Here then we rarely saw the star of 
the show (Montgomery himself) for all the ‘other’ eyes in the film looked directly 
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into ‘our’ protagonistic ones. This experiment was famously a failure for the 
voyeuristic distance so beloved of cinema (Mulvey46 et al) would paradoxically 
prevent the ‘immersion’ of stepping into the shoes of the screen-party rather than 
witnessing the scene from an associational distance. Another problem is the 
control of a space of comparison where we would be needed to be ever-present 
and thus outside of the constant locked character-optic. For if every component 
within the narrative-space is restricted to our optical-presence then unrestricted 
aspects unperceived by us ‘the character’ could not be compared or controlled by 
the omniscient narration (the obvious point about suspense as Hitchcock pointed 
out to Truffaut47 is showing more than the character knows and thus increasing 
our sense of empathy at their plight; for example a bomb ticking away under their 
seat). Thirdly, and most obviously for our purposes, the optical aspect does not 
hand over the reins, for nothing in the space is ever re-arranged by any extra-
diegetic empirical viewing. On these three grounds at least48 then the game is 
prevented from coinciding with such narrational first or third personage; for the 
interactivity of the game makes a mockery of the taking-up of these 
inside/outside positions: the game invaginates this divide. 
Games then in being a haunted49 différance-engine operate on the very 
boundary distinction of first and third person, text/and non-text, of performative 
and constative and of presence and absence. Designers are still mistakenly 
fighting (pragmatologically) to create a first-person performative with the 
additional security of the cinematic third-person constative: hence the promised 
‘Cinematic’ experience which game’s covers and cutscenes often wish to 
foreground50). This battle however is headed in entirely the wrong direction and 
cannot complete its mission, as the game is situated from bottom on openings. Let 
us look at a game which more openly welcomes or embraces its gamic nature. 
Like many games ‘Black and White’51 starts with a  cutscene which 
helps to situate the player in relation to the gamespace they are about to embark 
on. Here they are given their ‘character’ and welcomed into the world of the 
game’s ‘parameters’. Once this universal-constative cutscene is over and the 
particular-performative game-element embarked upon, the player finds they are 
actually occupying at least two positions, to a large extent fracturing any 
perspectivisation in that traditionally unified sense. Firstly there is the God-
mimicking ‘above’ position (literally ‘a hand’) where all areas of the game can be 
mobilised and manipulated, as in any decent top-down civilisation game. This 
leaves however a certain sense of de-focalised third-personage, placed as we are 
within the “third-person” position of distance or identificatory absence: ‘outside’ 
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the occupied space of the ground level. Godlike. A second position is offered in 
answer to this hovering absent-outside whereby a second ‘stand-in’ character, 
now within the space, can be influenced, coaxed as of a proxy (a ‘Beast’ character 
chosen from a line-up of cow, lion or monkey; each with their own initial 
attributes). Here is where this game gets its impetus or identity, in this fractured 
sewing-between third and first. We are a God who chooses to intervene but we 
also intervene on a character which also intervenes on further characters (the 
population of a village it will interact with). A double-intervening. A double 
placement and interest: expanding as the game unfolds. 
One interaction is constant, ready-to-hand and ours; obeying our 
controls, one-to-one, as in some I-extension. This extended-I is omnipotent, 
immanent and always seemingly ours. The second stand-in however is relatively 
autonomous and capable of change, without any exacting guarantee. Through a 
sort of Pavlovian conditioning, the as yet ill-formed Beast’s activities in this 
island-world are circumscribed, to an extent, given its relative autonomy, by 
reward and punishment (a stroke or a punch for example as it eats up villager or 
saves one from drowning). Thus the God-hand (for that is the tool with which we 
reward, punish and coax) upon the beast forms a sort of clumsy steering wheel 
that in attempting to drive the beast becomes a sort of conscious extension of it, 
in a Heideggerian sense. Our boundary with the beast is thus more fluid and 
removed than our ready-to-hand (of God) character which would seem also to be 
the first-person avatar of ourselves in-play (replacing the gun of the first-person 
shooter with the hand of our God-self). The beast-character acted upon by our 
extending-I hand then forms a secondary tool more present-to-hand, a tool-
towards-a-narrative-branching that we are constantly and consistently aware of. 
This character itself is however never consistent or determined. A problem 
already. For these two différant loci of operation (the hand and the beast; operator 
and operand) within themselves and within their difference provide also a 
variable and bleeding boundary dynamic between positions of first and the third 
person (God: for we are the position of the narratological third as in a linear text, 
experienced also as first in this game-text) and third-person-ed (beast) with 
attributes of a first which then provides the game’s irresolvable identity-play 
(and thus showing the game to be beyond constative and performative as 
distinctives). Three narratological dynamical parties then are at play in their 
presence in this game. The complex, even psychotic, status of first and third 
person is rarely addressed or problematised within the critical literature and tends 
to be reduced to easy positional differentiations (as we have seen) of first or third 
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and a clear diegetic arena within which their activities are thus then 
circumscribed.  
Let us concentrate briefly a little more here then, for economic 
simplicity, on one of the boundary-between parties only: the beast. This beast, 
this other-self, has fluidly open-closed (invaginated) boundaries which prevent us 
from landing it as some diegetically encircled third person constative position. 
Also however as acted-upon it cannot be wrapped in any performative first-
person immediacy.  
The opening few transactions of the game are centred on demonstrating 
to us its openness, its choices. Two character-guides or preliminary-chaperones, 
one angelic and one demonic (momentary helpers or traditional omniscient 
narrators as far as the game allows for such stabilised guiding hands) unravel the 
function of many of the game’s core components. They foreground for example 
the concept of the building up of the behaviours of the beast that we have taken 
on. In this rather camp parody52 of the cartoon’s (Good vs. Evil) disembodied 
‘inner voices’ we are told how we can affect various outcomes. Here then after 
this restrictive nursery-slope (once we are on our own) the game becomes far 
from black and white. This is why a textual analysis cannot really take us any 
further down these multiply-forking paths. How can one textually analyse such a 
shaded uncertain and undecidable object? How then can one talk of a diegetically 
locked temporo-spatiality, where by definition either a first or third person 
position could be defined? 
The beast, as neither constative third-person character nor performative 
first-person occupied tool, never sleepwalks along a path of calendar pre-
destination. By coaxing the character, and by having it continually on the edge of 
a slipping-away-from-grasp, we find a haunting sense of its future attributes in its 
de-centred present movements within the story-world ‘we-it’ occupies; making of 
‘it-we’ a flickering undecidable performative-constative (or as we saw earlier a  
Derridean re-coined performative). The beast is then is a de-central character of a 
morphous identity within this différance engine that is the slippery diegesis of the 
game’s fluid futurity. The important fluidity of this future and the haunting of the 
other-path cannot help but make us aware of the question of other always-already 
hanging over present-absences.  
That the ‘present-diegesis’ (the spacetime that the beast is “presently” 
inhabiting) is haunted by an-other diegesis makes any narrational absolute 
positioning of third-person constative eminently undecidable. That we are not 
free to operatively or performatively roam makes any metaphorical first-person 
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‘experiential’ equally undecidable. Such undecidabilities that we are opening up 
here cannot be closed down by the wishful thinking of the protective absolute 
oppositions of third or first person. Thus we must put in place a more knowing, 
open and avowedly undecidable recoined performative which contains and 
admits of its constative-iterative. 
 This more knowing and thus less certain re-coined iterative-
performative must recognise that neither a 1.0 locked constative (third-person) 
beloved of apparatus theory, nor an open and free-roaming performative (first-
person) beloved of reflexive models is correct for these new media spaces such 
as the game. Identity here is never knitted nor unknitted but also never simply a 
happy combination or resolution of the two (hence no 3.0 synthetically 
appreciating or sublating these differences). This irresolvable un-becoming 
flickering of the first and the third persons provides a telling problem in this 
différance-engine that is the videogame. That we cannot resolve this différance in 
the spacetime of the game may be something to celebrate... 
 ...For the game itself does not end in either definition by the game or by 
walking away free within it. The game goes far beyond the game and we will not 
be walking away from it. For we are not really playing it.  
We are facing our incompletion... 
 
Notes 
 
1 This of course purposefully and rather self-confidently utilises a computer 
program nomenclature to display a theoretical fitedness to the momentum of this 
modern world. 
2 Again we must underline the somewhat ironic sense of this progressive 1.0 
versus 2.0 mounting of hostilities. A younger generation of media theorists 
(typified in the parties of Merin, Gauntlet et al) parcel-up as “1.0” a seeming 
homogenous unity which does not recognise ludic play. More particularly they 
seem to say that media studies 1.0 does not seem to recognise that the world has 
moved on into the more client-sided pursuits of games, the internet and social 
networking sites. Thus the technologies-of-the-teaching need an overhaul as they 
are  in grave danger of being left behind and outstripped by their pedagogic 
student/objects (now turned teacher). Of course media theory was not previously 
sewn-up (or even sutured) by non-playful explanations. For example, one need 
only think of Fiske’s classical re-deployment of de Certeau and Bakhtin (almost a 
repeat of Merin’s re-deployment of Caillois) to see the role that play as tactics 
have had in the face of a seemingly faceless and strategic ideological power. It is 
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of course this latter ‘strategic’ aspect (as representative of ‘the server’ serving 
media to a linear down-stream consumer) that has here come into question. Still 
does this create a neat 2.0 departure? 
3 See Fiske, J., Television Culture. Routledge, London, 1987 for a clear example 
of this position of carnivaleque consumption which refuses to unwrap its parcel in 
the symmetrical way that the giving institution would prefer. 
4 See de Certeau, M., The Practice of Everyday Life, University of California 
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988 for a classic examination of the 
organising strategies of institutions versus the resistant counter-tactics of their 
users, consumers, etc. 
5  In 1987 with its System 6 operating system Macintosh Hypercards were much 
hyped and lead famously to popular games such as Myst as well as the 
popularising of interactive multimedia along with the Commodore Amiga’s 
‘Amigavision’ authoring system. 
6 See Aarseth, A,. Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature. The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1997. Though Aarseth rightly 
points out the difficult notion of a reader writing through choosing pathways, he 
points out that such choice does not in any way compete with a notion of writing. 
7 Here we could name Jay .G. Blumer, Wolfgang Iser, John Fiske, Stuart Hall, 
David Morley, Ien Ang, Standley Fish, Henry Jenkins, Martin Barker  and others 
8 See MacCabe’s ‘Realism: Notes on Some Brechtian Theses’ for a clear 
explanation of the workings of meta-narration within classic narrative texts. 
9http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/cgi-
bin/webadmin?A2=ind0801&L=MECCSA&P=R386&I=-3 for a brief entry on 
Merrin’s thinking on keeping up with strudent’s ludic experiences also the 
intereseted reader could  search the archive  for “media studies 2.0”  for other 
entries in this debate. This debate also responded to an  outline by Gauntlet of his 
thinking on media theory 2.0 to be found here: 
http://www.theory.org.uk/mediastudies2.htm. 
10 See Caillois R., Man, Play and Games, University of Illinois Press, Urbana and 
Chicago, 2001, for an influential analysis of the social functions of play from a 
number of angles including the ludic angle influential with Media 2.0 scholars.  
11  Rehak, B. ‘Playing at Being’ in The Video Game Theory Reader ed. M.J.P. 
Wolf & B. Perrron (Routledge, 2003) New York and London. p103-127. 
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12 Of course the use of the phrase ‘hey you!’ comes from Althusser in relation to 
the multitude of ideological state apparatuses but here interpellation makes us 
think of the use of  subject positioning by writers of the cinematic apparatus such 
as Baudry, Comoli, Mulvey and Heath as well as others centering around the 
journals Screen and Cinetracts in the 1970’s and 80s. For the interested reader, 
the every edition of Cinetracts is available in pdf format at the following website: 
http://dl.lib.brown.edu/cinetracts/ 
13 MacCabe, C., ‘Realism and the Cinema: Notes on Some Brechtian Theses’ in 
Popular Television and Film,  Tony Bennett (ed), BFI Press, London, 1981. 
14 Rehak op cit  p.119. 
15 Indeed we could open up a whole can of worms here in the use of diegesis in 
any sense or conjoining of terms, difficult as it would be to throw it away; thus 
reducing the open-closed of the game to the openness and thus entire lack of 
diegesis of the internet, for example. We use ‘extra-diegetic’ here heuristically to 
denote the distance of the game from the diegesis of the film (and in the absence 
of a better concept) but extra-diegetic has been utilized rightly to refer to things 
like titles or peacocks in Eisenstein’s ‘October’ which exist outside their 
respective story-spaces. This can may be worth opening however to expose the 
insurmountable narrative problems of the game. We can only mount an 
insubstantial challenge here ourselves.  
16 See Dayan D., ’The Tutor Code of Classical Cinema’ in Movies and Methods, 
Bill Nichols (ed),  University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1976, pp.438-450, as well as the chapter ‘On Suture’ in  Heath, S., Questions of 
Cinema, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1981, pp76-112. 
17 For the suturing of the spectator “completed” within the film’s shot-reverse-
shot takes the third-person ‘juxtapositions’ of the film’s dominant specularity and 
enacts for the audience a misrecognition of first-person identity. For more on 
misrecognition see Rosen, P., Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1986. Also see the two entries immediately below. 
18 Doane M.A.,‘Misrecognition and Identity’in Explorations in Film Theory: 
Selected Essays from Cinetracts, Ron Burnett (ed), Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1991, p15-25. 
19 See Metz, C., The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema, 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1986. 
20 Doane op. cit. p.19 
21 Rehak, op. cit.  p121. 
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22 Heidegger’s phrase (translated from ‘das-man’) for an inauthentic ‘Being’ 
which follows the machinic flock showing for example an inauthentic being-
towards-death (a disavowal of its real-coming) and thus a lack of authenticity in 
one’s present comportments. 
23 Rehak, op. cit.  p122. 
24 Here we see a paradox of ‘the break’ which there is no real time to go into here 
but which would take the ‘break’ of the shot-reverse-shot (something screen 
theory takes to actually suture) and by taking them away would suture ever the 
more. Here lies an illogical paradox in Rehak’s argument that would be worth 
unpicking further (beyond its confines in Rehak’s usage to further issues within 
notions of remediations of the cinematic). 
25 Here again there is the paradox of ‘programming’ which some remediating 
Screen theorists take as an enslaving power of the game: programming as if to 
program audient outcomes. We will be looking into this a little further in. 
26 Bolter a little like Rehak sees video games as carrying on or ‘remediating’ the 
work achieved by earlier media. 
27 Gauntlett, D. Media, Gender and Identity: An Introduction, Routledge, 2002 
p97. 
28 Ibid p. 142 
29 Osborne, P. & Segal, L., ‘Gender as Performance: An Interview with Judith 
Butler’, Radical Philosophy 67 (Summer 1994), pp32-39. 
30 Here performative is closed down from any prior materiality to a radical free-
choice without standing-order.  This combination of self-presence and reflexivity 
provides a tautological self-security which repeats the notion of the free-flowing 
individual, so beloved of the tradition. In dressing this tradition up in the garb of 
an escape-from-tradition the 2.0 theorist gains a very flexible tool. 
31  To match with portfolio identities we have portfolio work which contours 
identity within the ambit or ecology of the  infrastructural move from a previous 
industrial lifelong workplacedness  to a post-industrial ‘portfolio working’ where 
work focuses down to a highly mobile individual (the smallest company, as some 
have coined ‘him’). Countless employment studies (for example: Gold. M. 
‘Managing Self-management: Successful Transitions to Portfolio Careers’ in 
Work, Employment and Society Vol. 16, No 4.) point out this change in the 
dominant life-time. For a more worked out sociological view see Harvey, D.,     
The Condition of Postmodernity, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989 as well as Smart, B., 
Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies, Routledge, London and New 
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York, 1992. Such a transition (and self-reflexive freedom) is however figurally 
‘triangulated’ in the (rather patronisingly self-confident) film ‘Billy Elliot’, where 
a boy in a British northern industrial town ‘comes out’ to his locale as a ballet 
dancer (and to his somewhat pre-portfolio or ‘industrially’ situated dad).  The key 
moment in the film comes when the dad recognises his own attitudes are those of 
a passing age and that he must give way to these new and more mobile identities: 
his son should be able to choose the mode and identity he likes. Here we have a 
marked move in the figure of the problematic position of the ‘offspring’ from 
‘Saturday Night and Sunday Morning’ where Arthur Seaton is punished for his 
coming-out-of-the-collective through his use of music, drink and adulterous 
affairs. The traditional pre-reflexive ecology of the time was not yet ripe for 
choice. 
32 Turkle, S., Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet, Simon & 
Sschuster, New York, 1997. 
33 Filiciak, M., ‘Hyperidentities’ in The Video Game Theory Reader ed. M.J.P. 
Wolf & B. Perrron (Routledge, 2003) New York and London. pp87-102 
34  Ibid p95-97. 
35  ibid. p91 
36  Derrida, J. ‘Signature, Event, Context’ in ‘Margins of Philosophy’ (Press, 
London ) p.149 
37 Bulter ibid. p.13 
38 As father of Speech-Act theory Austin spoke of acts which could not be judged 
on any constative truth value but which inaugurate or perform an activity in the 
very act of saying. This causal-inaugurating of such acts of speech are what 
Derrida (like his ongoing deconstruction of the speech and writing opposition) 
problematises back into a citational anteriority, making of the performative a sort 
of arché-citation much like the famous arché-writing he makes  of speech which 
he then goes on to mobilize as a borrowed and retargeted (against the very 
conceptual framework borrowed from) tool to work on the tradition. 
39 This is one of Austin’s famous performatives with which Derrida takes issue: 
self-presence as non-iterable (within ‘Signature, Event, Context’) and in 
sympathy with which Butler anchors the reading to engage with questions or 
notions of sex/body (as probmematisers or contourings of ‘gender’). Gauntlett 
ignores this important influence, as some fast and loose freedom with the concept 
might then have been threatened by such noted conceptual filiations. 
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40 One need only think here of the ‘verb’ and its connection with the ‘verbal’. A 
‘doing’ word can only seem here to ‘be done’ when it is an originary ‘doing’; as 
is assumed in a performative speech act.   
41 We have to reinforce that the performative that Derrida uses is stretched from 
the contradictions noted within Austin’s theory. Austin’s ‘performative’ haunted 
by ‘constative’ (by iteration for example) is Derrida’s knowing misuse. 
42 Hence the notion of a ‘copyright’ that marks off an internal limit from its 
citational outside (wherein the latter possibility is repressed). 
43 Games as such then are not to be seen as strategic campaigns inviting resistant 
and escalating tactical counter campaigns on the part of the player (a la the 
counter-tactics cherished by de Certeau and his followers such as Fiske and his 
playful polysemically-equipped ‘semi-active’ consumers). Such notions of a 
firewallable identity are not a part of the game no matter how many boundaries 
are tried and tested. Here again is a contradiction which both defines the game 
and reveals why its future, to come, does not lie in any form of recalculated or 
reconditioned filmic presence. The game involves and always-already accounts 
for the free-play of the player. The computer can do nothing else than accept such 
user input. It is not then a war and thus not a real hacking.  
44 Could one talk about a Deleuzean becoming-first or becoming-third or of a fold 
between? Such a rhizomatic becoming from-the-divide however does not 
recognise the radicallity of the flickering undecideability between these 
‘positions’ as we hope to elaborate. 
45 Montgomery, R., Lady in the Lake, MGM, 1947. 
46  Mulvey, L., ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ in Popular Film and 
Television Tony Bennett (ed), BFI Press, London, pp.206-215. 
47  Scott, H.G. & F. Truffault, Hitchcock. Simon & Schuster, New York, 1985 
48  This small list of three could be expanded and an interesting study undertaken 
to further problematise the difference between so-called first-person videogames 
and traditional narrative or diegetic genres that employ the first-person but within 
the larger narratological web that is the text. This difference needs to be unlocked 
much more than it is within the literature and the gamic (which should not be 
reduced either to the ludological, after Caillois and Frasca) quality of the 
videogame exorcised from these differences. 
49  For an examination of the haunted or hauntological nature of the spacetime in 
videogames see Lockwood, D. & Richards, T., ‘Presence-Play: The Hauntology 
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of the Computer Game in ‘Games Without Frontiers, War Without Tears: 
Computer Games as a Sociocultural Phenomenon’. Jahn-Sudmann A., and  
Stockmann, R., (eds),Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp175-185. 
50 This perhaps is where the conceptual mistake can occur that games are 
necessarily like film, because so many games still want to be film (to remediate 
film). They have perhaps not attuned yet to their gamic potentiality. We would 
strongly argue then that the game is always already the game no matter how 
conservatively the nostalgia for film is evidenced, enforced, inscribed or 
seemingly concretised. There can then, as a product of this view, only be degrees 
of gamic rather than locatable or ontological differences of 'kind' within the 
game. A film-game is from bottom a contradiction. 
51 Lionhead Studios., ‘Black & White’ 
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